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The Russian Cinematic Culture
Oksana Bulgakova
The cinema has always been subject to keen scrutiny by Russia's rulers.
As early as the beginning of this century Russia's last czar, Nikolai
Romanov, attempted to nationalize this new and, in his view, threatening
medium: "I have always insisted that these cinema-booths are dangerous
institutions. Any number of bandits could commit God knows what crimes
there, yet they say the people go in droves to watch all kinds of rubbish; I
don't know what to do about these places." [1] The plan for a government
monopoly over cinema, which would ensure control of production and
consumption and thereby protect the Russian people from moral ruin, was
passed along to the Duma not long before the February revolution of
1917. [2] However, it was ultimately carried out in 1919 by the same
Bolsheviks who had executed Romanov, and Vladimir Lenin formulated
one of the Communist Party's political postulates in regard to cinema by
announcing it to be, in 1922, "the most important of all the arts." [3] Yet
it was truly made the most important medium of the new society by
Joseph Stalin, who expressed this almost metaphysical conviction in 1924:
"Film is an illusion, but it dictates its laws to life." [4]
When cinema first came onto the scene at the turn of the century as a
means to capture movement visually, and then rapidly grew into an
industry producing story-telling pictures, it became one of the first global
vehicles for expression, erasing national boundaries between cultures. The
first musings about this new technological phenomenon captured the shift
in cultural paradigms which defined the turn of the century: the eternal;
the fleeting moment; originality, abundance, genius; anonymous
collectivity and organic unity; chaos and composition; fragments and
organisms; mechanism and morality; amorality and depth; the
concentration of all feeling at the surface and the primary visual sense;
body and soul, etc. For this reason cinema, with its dense clotting of new
qualities (the visual, the immediate, the mechanical, etc.) was often
viewed as the quintissential vehicle for modernity.
Russian film, however, reflected values which had been defined by a preindustrial society; this was evident in the peculiarly archaic tendency of
this medium. This duality, which bespoke an ambivalence toward the
assimilation of modernity, shaped the specifics of Russian film for many
years. Russia managed to create an ideological and artistic construct
which was in direct and conscious opposition to the development of the

moving pictures industry throughout the rest of the world, particularly in
Hollywood . The stylistic similarities between Russian films and those
made in Europe or America -- be they the melodramas of the 'teens, with
their moody interiors; the virtual cinematic reality constructed in the filmstudios of the 1930s; or the "raw physical reality" so fashionable in the
1960s -- do not outweigh the profoundly different understanding and
function of film in Russia, which was tied inextricably to cultural tradition,
the promulgation of national stereotypes, and the means by which they
were implemented. I can do no more than sketch a few points of
demarcation within the development of this singular phenomenon which
we loosely term "Russian cinema," moving chronologically from the turn of
the century to our own time.
I will explore four cinematic crossroads in the evolution of Russian
cinematic culture: the connotation of cinema as a place of the death and
rebirth of the collective soul at the beginning of the century; the
palimpsest of old forms and radicalized means of expression in Russian
montage cinema, which was perceived abroad as a reflection of the
ruptured Russian soul in the 1920s; the cultivation of non-commercial yet
mass-scale cinema, oriented toward government-sanctioned collective
reverie from the 1930s through the '50s; and finally, modern-day
attempts to individualize cinematic expression.
The Turn of the Century: Celebration and Death
On May 9th, 1896, Nikolai Romanov arrived in Moscow , the ancient
capital, for his coronation in the Kremlin's Uspenskii Sobor (Chapel of the
Assumption). The ceremony was to have been followed by a mass
celebration at Khodynskii Field on May 18 and the distribution of royal
gifts. But the crowd of several thousand rushed to the site of the
festivities so precipitously that almost two thousand people were trampled
to death in the mad panic. Moscow 's governor-general had to put in his
appearance at the Vagankovskoe cemetery, where the bodies had been
carted, instead of the ball at the French embassy. Much of the Russian
intelligentsia interpreted this event as a symbolic overture to the new era,
as an omen of Russia 's fate. "Our people are not accustomed to
festivities. They tried it at Khodynskoe, bit off their own tail, and once
more the terrible mysterious monster crawled off into its gloomy den,"
remarked the writer Garin-Mikhailovsky, [5] using this new event to
buttress an age-old trope: Russians are fit for nothing but tragedy. The
first films shot in Russia , by Pathé Félix Mesguich, centered around these
very events. [6]

This Western technological invention, cinema, played a specific national
role in Russia , and one of its qualities became the lack of a "happy
ending." Almost all Russian films, even the most trivial, end in tragedy.
These inevitable unhappy endings are taken into account by audiences
and producers, both in Russia and abroad. Foreign producers often shot
two endings--a happy one for their own market, and an unhappy one for
Russian viewers who, unlike others throughout the world, only flocked to
tragic tales. Similarly, Russian producers would film a grim ending for the
home audience and a cheerful alternative for the outside world. Even the
parallel montage, with the inevitable last-minute salvation of its subject,
was altered. Yuri Tsivian, a historian of early Russian cinema, notes that
the Russian replica of D.W. Griffith's film "The Lonely Villa" (1909), called
"A Drama by the Telephone" and directed by Iakov Protazanov in 1914,
ends thus: The husband, after being warned over the telephone that
robbers are about to break into his house, rushes home after a mad car
chase only to come upon his wife's corpse. [7] These tragic endings -- in
death, suicide, insanity--upheld the foreign conviction of "terrific Slavic
emotions" and traced their roots to the Russian theatrical melodrama of
the nineteenth century. [8] This practice of double endings continued
through the beginning of the 1930s, when the Soviet directors Grigorii
Kozintsev and Leonid Trauberg were asked to film a separate European
ending to their heart-rending melodrama "S.V.D." In the Russian version
the hero dies before the eyes of a beautiful woman. The studio heads
suggested that the directors film the following alternative "bearing in mind
the demands of the foreign market: 'The general's wife finds him
unconscious (not dead) on the riverbank. Next scene: A park (with a villa
nearby, a lake in the distance, or better yet the sea), where we find the
hero sitting on a bench with a bandage around his head, indicating a
wound. Nearby, also in the park, the wife bustles around a lavishly set
table, caring for the convalescent. The words "The End" scroll down.'" [9]
The link between cinema and death became commonplace to Russian
audiences. Unlike many of the first Western filmgoers, who noted the
lifelike rustling of tree-leaves and recalled "the realistic effects" and
"animated nature," [10] the Russian visitor to the first film screening at
the Nizhnegorodskaia Trade Fair, watching that very same chronicle by
Pathé, might have agreed more with Maksim Gorky, who described the
spectacle as a necropolis, a kingdom of shadows, lifeless and frightening
space: "There are no sounds, no colors. There, everything--the earth, the
trees, the people, the water, the air--is tinted in a grey monotone.. This is
not life but the shadow of life; this is not movement but the soundless
shadow of movement. . . . Curses and ghosts, evil spirits that have cast

whole cities into eternal sleep come to mind. . . . " [11]
Even more so than portraiture or photography, film was perceived as life's
dangerous phantom double, with various mystical powers. This link is a
frequent theme in the plots of many early Russian films; it became central
to many films by the most significant director of the period, Evgenii
Bauer: "After Death" (1915), based on Ivan Turgenev's short story "Klara
Milich; "Daydreams" (1915) based on Georges Rodenbach's "Bruges la
Morte"; or "The Dying Swan" (1916), based on Stanislaw
Prszybyszewsky's novel Homo Sapiens. "The Dying Swan" is especially
noteworthy as a singular explanation of the nature of cinema.
The plot follows two storylines: The hero leaves a mute dancer for a
singer. The mute dancer begins to model for a decadent artist, who seeks
to capture absolute beauty in the seemingly impossible synthesis of
dynamics and absolute tranquility -- that is, in stopped motion -- so he
kills his model during their session. The themes linking these stories -muteness, motion, beauty, and death -- become a symbolic interpretation
of the nature of film itself. The heroine's muteness emphasizes her intense
expressiveness, which definitively paraphrases cinema's unspoken goal, to
take away speech and reveal the soul in gesture alone, without verbal
mediation. Life's intrinsic banality is tied to voice and speech--hence the
sordid little affair between the hero and the singer. The second cinematic
paradigm lies in the juxtaposition of motion and stillness, beauty and
time. In 1914 Bauer made a film based on the symbolist Valerii Briusov's
poem "Life in Death," which touched upon a similar theme. The story
revolves around a doctor who kills and embalms his wife in order to
preserve her beauty forever. With this plot, Bauer seemed to anticipate
André Bazen's essay on "The Ontology of the Photographic Image," which
tied the birth of cinema and other plastic arts with the practice of
embalming, finding therein the bases for a "mummy complex." Death, the
ultimate victory over time, opposed the desire to fix artificially the visible,
physical object, tearing it out of the flow of time and thus attaching it to
life, which "flows" from subject to reproduction, finally liberated from
convulsive stillness by cinematic imagery.[12] It is no accident that dance
was such a beloved theme of early filmmakers.[13] Yet
cinematic motion is an illusion; film consists of a series
of motionless photographic stills, which freeze the minutiae of movement.
This death of motion signifies that absolute calm which the decadent artist
seeks in vain in the old expressive arts, identifying frozen motion with
absolute beauty. Death and film share the ability to freeze motion and
time. These parallels, so crucial to Russians' initial response to cinema,
were also reflected in fashionable literary themes at the turn of the

century -- the novellas of Edgar Allan Poe or Villiers de l'Isle
Adam's Contes Cruels.
Yet in its aesthetic Russian cinema fiercely rejects modernism, relying
instead on a peculiar brand of creative anachronism: Russian artistic
achievements of the late nineteenth century (Turgenev's and Tolstoy's
novels, the Peredvizhniks' naturalist school of painting, the psychology of
daily life explored by the Malyi Theatre and refined in Konstantin
Stanislavsky's Theatre Academy) are co-opted by film and presented as
the pinnacles of twentieth century art. Specifically, this resulted in slowmoving narrative; the conscious rejection of montage (Russian actors
perfected a singular method of explicitly showing the passage from one
state to another, while montage strives toward elliptical abbreviation);
and sets cluttered with various everyday objects and furniture, which
rendered the overall composition more theatrical than cinematographic.
These peculiarities contradicted the essential poetics of the new medium-dynamism, simultaneous action, ruptured connections, random action, the
primacy of fragments over the whole. The Russian avant-garde managed
to derail the dominant tendencies of Russian filmmaking only for a short
period in the 1920s; they returned, in slightly altered form, to the cinema
of the '30s.
As a new sociological phenomenon, however, film attracted the attention
of a wide spectrum of intellectuals--everyone from social-democrats
toNarodniks to the symbolists. All of them were fascinated by the
audience, the public response to film, since this was, after all, the first
truly democratic form of enterntainment. Russian cities had no previous
entertainment industry which catered to the lower classes, unlike
European and American cities. There was no street theatre, no music
halls, and even the variety-theatres were more like artistic clubs, closed to
the masses. Yet in 1912, the writer Alexander Serafimovich remarks with
surprise: "Look out into the rows of a movie-house audience. You will be
amazed at the composition of the public:everyone is here -- students and
militia-guards, writers and prostitutes, officers and girl-students, all kinds
of intellectuals in glasses, with beards, and workers and clerks and society
ladies and hairdressers and bureaucrats--just about everybody!"[14] The
populist democrats viewed the movie-house as an ideal opportunity to
enlighten the masses. Russian symbolists hoped that by uniting all layers
of society under one roof and subjecting them to the same emotional
experience they might realize their dream of "collective action," in the
spirit of Viacheslav Ivanov's theories. Liberal utopianists saw the gathering
of different social strata as a guarantee of social harmony; shared
emotional experience makes class distinctions obsolete.[15] The cinema

was seen as a place of social consolidation. Similar utopias, as well as the
romanticization of the movie-going public, are rare in the
Western/European world. The cinema is a freakshow where the monster
on display is the public itself, where the asthmatic children of syphilitics
collapse in fits of coughing and drunken proletarians mutter to themselves
-- or so a doctor from the Berlin University clinic, Alfred Doblin, describes
this convergence of social strata.[16] The chief concerns of the Western
intelligentsia--the collapse of a unified worldview, the scattering of
perception which leads to the fragmentation of personality, aesthetics
giving way to the immediate, the superficial, expression on a mass scale-were only on the periphery of Russia's cultural perception with regard to
the cinema. The movie-house was seen as a place of collective unity, the
salvation of a society rattled to its foundations by the reforms of the
beginning of the century.
The cinema connoted the death of life and the resurrection of the
collective spirit.
The 1920s. Montage and the Split of the Soul
In 1917 the world of Russian cinema collapsed along with the rest of the
Russian world. Three of the more successful pre-revolutionary filmmakers-Alexander Khanzhonkov, Iosef Ermoliev, and Dmitri Kharitonov-managed to emigrate to Western Europe by way of the Crimea and
Odessa, taking with them not only most of the available studio equipment,
film reserves, archives of film negatives, etc., but also their creative and
technical personnel: directors, cameramen, set artists, costume designers,
administrators, and popular actors. In 1917, 337 films were made in
Russia ; in 1918, there were only six. Most of the films made during the
first seven years of Soviet rule have not survived due to the lack of film on
which to make copies; a few were printed several years after they were
first made, as was the case with "Polikushka," which was filmed in 1919
yet did not make it to the screen until 1922. Since the economic blockade
limited opportunities to import film (which was not produced in Russia)
from abroad, Soviet filmmakers developed a complicated method of
"rinsing off" old films and treating the celluloid with new emulsion. There
is no way to know how effective this particular method was, but Soviet
cinema immediately established itself as a palimpsest of pre-revolutionary
film on many other levels. The first Soviet films imitated the forms of
older Russian cinema in almost every way, from plot devices (for example,
the lovers' triangle ending in death) and set design to actors and
montage. In 1922 Alexander Panteleev (who had made the first Soviet
propaganda film, "The Miracle-Worker," in 1919 and been praised by

Lenin), shot a tried-and-true Russian melodrama entitled "There is No
Happiness on Earth." The husband has no money, but does have
tuberculosis, and his pretty young wife is easily seduced by his rich friend.
After the radical reforms in family law passed in 1918 divorce no longer
posed any legal problems, but still could not be the subject of a film.
Thus, the husband commits suicide and the wife goes insane. The
profound and deeply rooted pessimism of traditional Russian film was not
shaken by the revolution. Panteleev even saved the interior design of the
old sets (a yacht or a boudoir with bronzed mirrors and champagne for
the traditional seduction scene, a bourgeois parlor for the family scenes).
Only a few inconsequential details refer to the new reality: Instead of a
bank, the husband works at the Smolnii (Bolshevik headquarters); the
seducer is an emigré who returns to Petrograd with an American passport
and dollars. Even more incredible is the retention of Russian film's
traditional allegorical forms--a fatalistic historical philosophy far from Karl
Marx's class doctrine. Gardin's historical allegory of the revolution, with its
title--"A Ghost Wanders Through Europe" (1923) -- inspired by
Marx'sCommunist Manifesto, is actually a retelling of Edgar Allan Poe's
gothic horror story "The Masque of the Red Death." The turbulence of the
revolution is ascribed to mystical forces, as the results of plague, as an
outraged father's personal vengeance for his daughter's seduction and
ruin, etc. Moreover, Gardin employs the same nature motifs, props, and
costumes as Bauer had used in his 1916 film "The King of Paris"! Cheslav
Sabinsky's 1924 agitational film "The Venerable Vasilii the Filthy" mocks
the traditional saga of a saint's life with antireligious subtitles. But without
these subtitles the film could easily be perceived as a morality tale about
a repentant sinner, especially since it imitates the psychological
naturalism of the film "Father Sergii" (directed by Iakov Protazanov in
1916).
Seven years after the revolution Soviet publicists began to catch on that
there was no new Soviet cinema, and demanded that the Bolshevik party
undertake decisive measures regarding the politics of financing filmmaking
and taxation of movie theatres.[17] Various members of the avant-garde
also demanded radical reforms. In August of 1922 the constructivist
Aleksei Gan published the first issue of his magazine "Kino-Phot," which
became a platform for Russia 's first "modernist" filmmakers Dziga Vertov
and Lev Kuleshov.[18] Vertov developed his models of "dynamic
geometry" and the "kino-eye," which were based on a total rejection of
the mimetic, psychological, or eccentric "theatre-as-film," which
emphasized the immanent freedom of the camera, which has the ability to
see what the human eye cannot. The director is equally free from the
constraints of logic, and creates his own particular connections between

the segments of this new vision (telescopic, microscopic,
cinematographic...), liberally manipulating speed, time, space, and
causality. The rules of montage, as well as the rules of film imagery, were
based on a medial grammar, similar to the "unintelligible language" of
futurist poetry (in which Vertov had dabbled before becoming a
filmmaker). However, in seeking an absolute cinematic language, Vertov
was placed by chance at the head of the political chronology of film,[19]
which led to certain conflicts between "abstract filmmaking" and concrete
social demands. Vertov was criticized on both the left and the right as a
"false documentarian," and the interpretation of "cinematic truth"
remained eternally ambiguous (frequently overlooked was the fact
that cinematic truth was by its very nature a step removed from reality).
"All of his (Vertov's) work was aimed at studying the rhythmic nature of
montage... For his experiments with various rhythmic variations created
from pieces of film, he needed the sort of material that he could cut up
with scissors however he wanted. 'Life as it is' was the perfect material -random bits in which nothing is 'constructed,' filmed by different people in
different places. For the most part these were cuts of filmed, evenly
paced, repetitive processes: people working, machines working, the
movement of crowds, etc. ," remarked Vsevolod Pudovkin, one of Vertov's
few colleagues who thought that it was "utterly ridiculous to consider
(him) a 'documentarian.'"[20]
Lev Kuleshov's career was no less paradoxical. He started out as an artist
working on films with Evgenii Bauer, to whom he dedicated his book about
cinema entitled The Banner of Cinematography, which explored the
medium's two main constructive elements: light and space.[21] Kuleshov
almost parodies the expressive beauty of Bauer's films in his"bare" shots - the objects and set decorations are all markedly geometric in shape,
contours and textures are permeated with light, the background is
neutral, the props are carefully chosen and their number deliberately
limited. The natural environment in Russia, its "motley peacock slush," is
not photogenic enough for film, according to the director.[22] According to
Kuleshov, only specific architectural structures possess this photogenic
quality (for example, railroad bridges and skyscrapers, due to their
immediately perceivable geometric form). Dynamic--and hence
cinematographic -- objects include cars, locomotives, airplanes,
motorcycles, and specially synchronized actors, trained in a specific
method which Kuleshov termed "naturism," who had complete control
over their bodies and could create cinematic motion which had nothing to
do with chaotic day-to-day movement.
Kuleshov believed that cinema must be maximally dynamic, a concern for

American filmmakers as well. For this reason Kuleshov termed his method
of cinematic expression "Americanism," which meant specifically the
presentation of movement in an elliptical, abbreviated way. His films
revolved around themes such as rapid motion and the protagonist's ability
to control this speed, whether it be a machine, technology, or his own
body as the ultimate machine. The average length of one shot in Bauer's
film "Mute Witnesses" (1914) was, according to Yuri Tsivian's count, about
one minute--six times slower than in American motion pictures. The
average length of a shot in Kuleshov's first film, "Engineer Pright's Project"
(1918) was six seconds, which was one and a half times faster.
The flat, rectangular screen put constructive restraints on Kuleshov,
helping to reduce the amount of visual information (for instance, rotating
the geometric shapes of the objects being filmed, motion which runs
parallel or diagonally to the frame of the shot, and movement which
avoids curved lines) and making it more comprehensible. The burden of
semantics lies in the junction of the shots. Montage either shortens or
draws out time, creating spaces which cannot exist in reality. In his
experiments with montage, Kuleshov proved that the viewer automatically
establishes space-time and cause-and-effect relationships between
disparate fragments.
Russian art is radical in its emotion -- it takes everything right up to the
end.” This is how the most influential Berlin critic, Alfred Kerr, attempted
to describe this new Russian cinematic phenomenon in the introduction to
his book The Russian Cinema.[23] The book’s opening photograph,
however, depicts a Chechnyan soldier with a knife between his teeth. It is
no accident that montage is acknowledged to be the fundamental
distinguishing characteristic of Russian film. Russian directors avidly
experimented with montage, as did the French and German avant-garde.
Yet this technique, which frequently involves the contraposition and
splicing of two completely unrelated images, bespeaks the specific
mentality of Russian national cinema (perhaps as a manifestation of the
violent internal split in the Slavic-Tatar soul). In “Potemkin” Kerr sees an
“apocalyptic vision of the future,” and credits the film’s success to its vivid
realism, the ethnographic models employed, and also to Stanislavsky (“He
laid the foundation for Russian film”) and Dostoyevsky (“the same
abysmal passions”).[24] The German critics juxtapose Eisenstein’s
naturalism, models, montage, and mass-scale scenes with the historical
pictures made in Hollywood , which seem like idyllic pastorals in
comparison. However, the critic Oscar A. H. Schmitz approaches
“Potemkin” in terms of the nineteenth-century novel and thus finds none
of the qualities of ‘true art’ in the film (which lacks a distinct protagonist

who thinks and suffers, an individual consciousness). Walter Beniamin
challenges this view, declaring that “Potemkin” charts the coordinates of
the new twentieth-century art: violence and the masses, collective destiny
and technology.[25]
Western European critics tended to see Russian films as the expression of
one author, one genius, though this contradicted the new artist’s creed in
Soviet Russia: He presents his professional skill to the working classes,
articulating its interests and desires; he is their medium, answering
society’s demands. These passionate, violent, sentimental, eccentric,
propagandistic, and experimental new Russian films found their admirers
among millionaires and Dadaists, psychoanalysts and professional
revolutionaries. They included Antonin Artaud, Charlie Chaplin, Douglas
Fairbanks, and Le Corbusier. At the same time, those very films which
gained the greatest critical reputation abroad as models of the new
Russian art flopped at home. Russian audiences preferred either Western
or Soviet popular films, with American, German, or Russian stars such as
Douglas Fairbanks, Harry Piel, Conrad Veidt, or Vera Malinovskaya.
According to a Kino-Gazette survey, the most popular Soviet director of
the 1920s was not Eisenstein, but Abram Roam, who had made a comedy
about a three-way marriage called “The Third Bourgeois” (1927). “Our
cinema here has a pre-war atmosphere. I’m talking about the big picture,
so to speak. Right now the story of the prodigal son is a popular theme: a
man strays away from the straight and narrow, but finally returns to his
own. Along the way, he sees corruption and decay among the bourgeoisie.
But the bourgeoisie is already corrupting the film studios. . . . The
Revolution comes, and is stretched to fit the frame of a romance without
the slightest trace of irony! The plot collapses on itself, while on the
screen we see the words ‘And in the meantime, poor Paulina. . . .’ We
know that Eisenstein works differently, but he doesn’t count. He is a
national park, a state-protected area.”[26] The leftist front, which
published this article by one of the most cutting film-critics of the ‘20s,
Viktor Shklovsky, fiercely denounced this "brainwashing" which went
under the name of cinema, where the bourgeoisie flocked for their scrap
of cheap daydream, given permission to “legally desert reality.”[27] The
leftist front declared film to be among the most menacing cultural threats,
rivaling vodka and opium, and began an aggressive attack in 1927-28
upon “entertainment” cinema. Meanwhile, in 1928, the Party called
together the first cinema-workers’ conference on film issues, which
became a turning point in the life of this new medium in Soviet Russia.
The 1930s-1950s: Collective Daydreaming

In 1927-28, foreign-currency funding for cinema was drastically curtailed,
which brought about radical change. First, factories had to be built to
produce film and other equipment, which had previously been entirely
imported from abroad, mostly from Germany . Second, the importation of
foreign movies (by the late 1920s, these were mostly American) came to
an abrupt halt. The viewer was left with nothing but the cinema of his
fatherland, now hemmed in on three sides -- economically, technically,
and ideologically.
A new Party worker came to the head of the film industry; Boris
Shumiatsky gained control of the restructuring process which initiated the
incredible mass expansion of Soviet cinema. He faced several limitations:
the number of viewers was growing while the number of movie theatres
built and film-copies available for rent (this had become technically
feasible with the native production of positive film) were shrinking. The
number of pictures being produced fell rapidly. In 1928, 124 films were
released in the Soviet Union; in 1930 there were eleven; in 1933--twentynine; in 1936--forty-three; in 1947 -- twenty-three; in 1950 -- thirteen,
and in 1951 -- nine. [28] And yet, this gradual freeze in film production
was not initially perceived as a significant element in the development of
Soviet cinema. At first, Shumiatsky dreamt up grandiose plans to increase
production to 800 films a year, and envisioned wild expenditures on the
creation of a kino-city in the Crimea , styled after Hollywood. [29] But film
studios rarely carry out their plans. Instead of the sixteen pictures slated
for release in 1936, Mosfilm (the most powerful studio) produced only
thirteen. The program for expanding production was rejected; Shumiatsky
was exposed as a saboteur and enemy of the people, who had failed to
understand the real nature of the problems facing cinema. In 1938 he was
arrested and shot. In the press he was damned as “fascist swine” and a
propagator of “conveyer-belt cinema,” mass-produced, antinationalist forms of “kino-americanism” (italics mine).[30] His methods,
including the kino-city project, were oriented toward the international
cinematic standard, instead of seeking the authentic Russian, Soviet way.
Although the number of films being made was falling drastically, the
number of movie theatres grew; in 1928 there were 7331 movie theatres
in operation (almost a third of these in the country), and in 1936 there
were 28, 931 (more than half in rural areas).[31] If new films arrived on
the screen about every two weeks in the 1920s, by the ‘30s it took a
month for no more than four pictures to open.[32] The number of copies
distributed of each film was predetermined by the Central Authority of
Cinematography. Thus there were 955 copies of “Lenin in October”
compared to 198 copies of the adventure film “Karo.”[33] In this way the
audience’s tastes and consumption itself were regulated and controlled.

The people, on their part, were forced to sit through the same movie from
a limited, rarely changing repertoire over and over, because cinema
remained the only form of cheap entertainment. People learned movies by
heart, and developed a specific sort of pleasure in repeated viewings,
rather like a toddler enraptured by repeating words.
The cut-backs in film production resulted from significant technical
difficulties (for instance, the transition from silent to talking movies—
which was not complete in the Soviet Union until 1936, the building of
factories to produce film equipment, the conversion of the old silent
studios, and the construction of new studios in the republics of central
Asia, which had no native film industry). Additional problems were caused
by the unstable economy, controlled by the same Party/government
apparatus which financed cinema.
In the 1920s, financial support from the government was insignificant; the
organization Sovkino put in about four million rubles, which might pay for
thirty pictures—about one fourth of the total output for the year. The
national cinema survived thanks to revenue generated by imported
pictures and native commercial production, which brought in over sixteen
million rubles in that same year.[34] In the thirties this situation reversed
itself; government funding increased significantly, reaching 465 million
rubles by 1937 (of which only 225 million were used). However, customer
revenue in that same year only came to 20, 395 rubles.[35] Admission
prices rose along with the state’s sweeping investment; the profit margin
was too low to justify the immense expenditure, even after the range and
variety of movies increased. However, in contrast to the 1920s, the
government and the Party were prepared to free the film industry from
the financial squeeze; that is, they took the entire financial burden of
production and distribution upon themselves, in exchange for the right to
participate actively in the collective creative process, on the same plane as
the screenwriter and the director—at least, this is how Boris Shumiatsky
defines their role in 1936.[36] This government takeover took place over
the course of a decade, between 1928 and 1938, and at first the Party
was not sure whether to view cinema as a commercial enterprise,
generating income, or a state-supported means of propaganda. At the
Fifteenth Party Congress, Stalin held on to the hope that “maybe we could
gradually phase out vodka and bring in radio and cinema as significant
sources of revenue,”[37] echoing Trotsky’s old ideas.[38] But even when
these hopes remained unrealized, the politics of government spending did
not change. The noncommercial Soviet socialist cinema that emerged at
this time was a deliberate counterweight to Hollywood ’s materialism.
Despite these attempts to avoid crass Western-style mercantilism, Soviet

cinema was rarely touted as an author’s work; this enterprise, suddenly
blessed by the government’s attention, needed to establish common
poetics of expression—which, paradoxically, led to a homogeneity typical
of commercial film. Both aim to be captivating and comprehensible to the
masses. The 1928 Party Conference identified this as one of the crucial
dilemmas facing Soviet cinema. From the outset, its development rests on
an inherent oxymoron—noncommercial, yet requiring mass consumption.
“In Russia , the cinema is not a form of entertainment as it is in other
countries,” notes a British film critic. “It has a definite goal--to inculcate a
sense of social unity,”[39] that is, to develop collective identity.
The 1930s were dedicated to seeking out some common model for Soviet
cinema, one to which all directors could conform, even ones as different
as Eisenstein and Abram Roam. The development of this collective model
required the dissolution of boundaries among genres, between creative
and documentary film. After the second World War, for example, Stalin
ordered creative film directors to film reenactments of its most important
battles, ‘corrected’ to show the required outcomes. Not surprisingly, such
epics as Vladimir Petrov’s “Stalin’s Battle ” (1946), Igor Savchenko’s “The
Third Strike” (1948), and Mikhail Chiaurely’s “The Fall of Berlin” (1952)
were presented as documentary dramas. Documentary film, on the other
hand, was often acted out, with staged news footage such as the scenes
showing the unification of the Don and Stalingrad fronts in Leonid
Varlamov’s “ Stalingrad ” (1942). The cameraman Roman Karmen recalls
that he was late to arrive to shoot a news report in Stalingrad , so the
arrest of the German general Paulius was repeated in front of the camera
by the actual participants.
The structures of production facilitated the development of a common
model for collective art. It was not even necessary to unionize the film
industry, as the writers had been. The very mechanism of film production
was easily controlled, most often by Stalin himself. His was the final word
on everything from the film studios’ thematic plans to set design and
shooting arrangements to the confirmation of editors and major actors.
Sometimes these editors, directors, and actors were invited to the
discussions. But most often Ivan Bolshakov, who took over the post of
director of the Central Authority of Cinematography in 1939, had to
interpret Stalin’s coughs and mutterings during a screening and decode
them into directive instructions for the reworking of a film.[40]
One should be able to attribute the decline in film production during this
period to technical and economic difficulties, but contemporaries most
often saw it as the direct result of Stalin’s censorship, which was

buttressed by his ideas on the “production of masterpieces.” This lively
economic theory (why devote so much energy to make many mediocre
pictures when you can hire the best screenwriter, director, cameraman,
composer, and actors, and make a few brilliant films?) was never really
fixed in history, and is passed on orally as part of Soviet cinematic lore, an
anecdote.[41] It is easily accepted as a reasonable explanation, one which
denies any actual technical difficulties and presents Stalin’s films as the
products of careful planning, a triumph of spirit and will over the petty
reality of figures. Yet the cinema’s position in this highly hierarchical
system of artistic creation in the 1930s remains ambiguous.
In the autumn of 1936, plans were revealed for the construction of the
Great Academic Movie Theatre, which was to tower over two of Moscow ’s
central squares — the Red Square and the Sverdlov. This gigantic
structure was to stand directly across from the Bolshoi Theatre and, while
imitating its architectural style, dominate the older building visually with
its immense height and mass. While the Bolshoi seated 2000, the movie
theatre was to pack in twice that number.[42] A movie theatre was also
planned for the Palace of the Soviets. This one was to seat 20,000, with
films showing simultaneously on four separate screens. Neither project
was carried out, but they point up the drastically increased value placed
on cinema. If, in the 1920s, architects grouped movie theatres with other
commercial buildings, by the 1930s they had become an independent
architectural category.
The marked attention focused on cinema did not change the radical
reorientation of its function and perception: this was not a separate form
of art, but a translator, an audio-visual receiver, a medium. In this sense
one might consider a suggestion made by Aleksei Stakhanov, a workerhero who once mined fourteen times the normal amount of coal during a
single shift. He formulated the new problem facing Soviet filmmakers.[43]
The people want to live cultured lives, he writes in his article, but the
scoundrels and saboteurs in charge of the film industry won’t send talking
pictures to the coal-mining villages. And in the meantime, workers on
the Kholkhoz (collective farm—trans.) want to listen to Beethoven. So why
not simply film performances given by the best singers and public
speakers? This demand in the form of a question was only one indicator of
the commonly sanctioned view of cinema as a medium, an art form with
no language of its own. Practically, Stakhanov’s suggestion unleashed a
special genre of Soviet cinema—the film-concert, film-play, film-opera,
and film-ballet. No one expected the translation of concerts or plays at the
Khudozhestvennyi or Malyi theatres to the cinematic medium to alter
them. No influence was ascribed to the fact of film itself. Soviet cinema

was not alone in bringing together theatrical performances and cinema
after the introduction of sound. Radio programs were also translated to
film in Europe and America (for instance, “Elstree Calling,” Adrian Brunel,
Alfred Hitchcock, 1929/30). In Hollywood popular plays and musicals are
brought to the big screen. But in the context of the polemics among wellknown filmmakers and theorists of silent cinema (such as Rudolf Arnheim,
René Clair, or Charlie Chaplin) about the dubious aesthetics of
“photographed theatre,” the Soviet solution to this question seems
especially archaic and radical. The transfer of theatrical text to the big
screen takes place with no “cinematographization.” Cinema becomes
simply a means of preservation, a medium for translation, and a way to
popularize high art. It deliberately returns to the role to which it was
relegated in the first decade of its existence. In 1914 Vladimir Mayakovsky
summarized a widespread opinion that "Art provides us with lofty and
meaningful images, while cinema multiplies and scatters them to the most
remote corners of the world, much as the printing press has done with
books. It cannot be its own separate art form."[44]
In his memoirs Konstantin Simonov recounts a noteworthy scene: In 1940
Stalin banned the film "The Laws of Life," and its author, Alexander
Avdeenko, was subjected to harsh criticism. After the Central Committee
meeting, someone asked Stalin what was to be done with the film's
directors, Alexander Stolper and Boris Ivanov, who had also been present.
Stalin casually twirled his finger in the air, imitating the rotation of film in
a projector, and replied, "Them? Who cares? They just spun out the stuff
that was written for them."[45] Cinematographers, as well as cinema
itself, were reduced to the medium of preservation, arrangement, and
translation of images; theirs was not an independent art. Their product is
secondary, based on a preexisting text. In this visual medium, words are
valued far more than images; the screenplays which began to be
published in the journal The Art of Cinema (Iskusstvo Kino) in 1936, and
which were later published in special editions and even anthologies, were
subjected to particular scrutiny. Most of the censorship cases in the 1930s
involved the literary editing of the screenplay, the dialogue, and its
relation to the written text (of the ballet, opera, novel, or play.)
Soviet cinema developed outgrowths such as the "revolutionary film," the
"labor film," the "Kholkhoz film." These categories seem out of place in a
system which has its own established cinematic genres: detective stories,
melodramas, comedy, slapstick—all of which were acknowledged to be
cinematic because of their well-developed and clearly defined patterns of
motion (the chase scene in detective stories; the gags and motorcycle
stunts in slapstick; the dramatic buildup resolved with a last-minute

rescue in melodrama). The nebulous definitions of "revolutionary," "labor,"
and "Kholkhoz"resulted in some peculiar hybrids of established genres.
Revolutionary films borrowed from the old monumental pictures, with
their mass scenes and apotheoses (for example, Carmine Gallone's "Quo
Vadis" or Griffith's "Intolerance"), which also made effective use of
teeming masses, battle scenes, and staged catastrophes (floods, fire,
volcanic eruption). Only instead of the burning of Rome or the Babylonian
siege, the Soviet version tackled a single, eternally unchanging, national
mass action: the Revolution. A prototype for Soviet monumental films of
the 1930s became "We, the People of Kronstadt" (1936) by Vsevolod
Vishnevsky and Efim Dzigan: it got rid of the nominal romance of
struggling lovers set against the background of grand historical spectacle,
and retained only the kinetics of the mass scenes. In the other films—
about labor and life on the Kholkhoz—the love story is but an insignificant
detour from the main plot of socialist struggle or the emancipation of
women. Comedies, which revolved entirely around romantic intrigue, were
harshly criticized or even banned outright, as was the case with
Konstantin Iudin's belatedly released "The Heart of Four" (1941).
Even the weakest romantic subplots, such as the love story between Anka
and Petka in "Chapaev" by the Vasiliev brothers (1934) was viewed as a
relic of "the faceless international stewpot of storylines, with its lazy
dependence on genres and pseudo-reality," "a rote tribute to
Americanism."[46] As opposed to the films of the '20s, which brought to
the fore the chaotic movement of the collective body ("The Battleship
Potemkin"), the monumental films of the '30s have the organized moving
masses revolving around their director — Stalin. Soviet film could only
achieve total expression when it ceased to be a medium for other art
forms (the traditional, hence unworthy path), and became its own reality
and most importantly, its own version of history. The Soviet monumental
films were peculiar not only in their rejection of tried-and-true narrative
structures. The cinema took on the role of a chronicler, which merely
modified its existing intermediary status.
In the 1930s a single subject became the theme for all manner of art
forms -- from novels, plays, opera, ballet, and film to miniatures,
sculptures, and monuments. Cinema managed to develop and elaborate
this established trope with more refinement than any of the others. The
same subject was thought out, planned out, peppered with new details in
various films which, when taken together, formed a sort of fictional place
and time which nonetheless came into sharper and sharper focus with
each new production. Almost every leading Soviet film director shot the
history of the October uprising. Beginning with Sergei Eisenstein's

"October" in 1927, this story came out onto the big screen every decade,
for the anniversary of the Revolution, with a ready supply of component
parts and often in several different films. In 1937-38 the first group of
these pictures was produced: Mikhail Romm's "Lenin in October," Mikhail
Chiuareli's "The Great Fiery Glow," Grigorii Koznitsev and Leonid
Trauberg's "The Vyborg Side," and Sergei Iutkevich's "The Man with the
Gun." Since these films presented the exact same historical events, an
episode from one screenplay could easily be transferred to another, as it
happened when Stalin ordered the scene of dispersing the administrative
meeting to migrate from Iutkevich's screenplay to Koznitsev and
Trauberg's film. In Romm's "Lenin in October," Lenin gives the worker
Vasilii an article to pass along to Stalin in the Pravda offices; in Chiaureli's
"The Great Fiery Glow" Stalin reads over Lenin's article in Pravda's
editorial offices; and in "The Man with the Gun" soldiers in the trenches
read the article which Lenin published in Pravda. In Romm's film Lenin
writes something undiscernable to the viewer in a notebook, while in
Chiaureli's the camera zooms in on the notebook so that the words may
be read. Stalin, who stands silently before a map in Romm's film, gives
audible orders to seize the Central Post Office in Chiaureli's. Romm shows
the actual storming of the post office. When the soldiers write a letter to
Lenin in Iutkevich's film, it is read in Chiaureli's. The question of agrarian
reform which is raised in Iutkevich's film is answered in Romm's. "The
Vyborg Side" opens with the final shot and closing lines of "Lenin in
October." They are overheard by the film's protagonist, who is returning
to the Bolsheviks' military headquarters in Smolny after the arrest of the
Provisional Government, which had been shown by Chiuareli and Romm.
Several shots become canonical, to be reproduced again and again. For
instance, Romm borrowed the composition and mise-en-scene of
Eisenstein's storming of the Winter Palace through the front gates
("October," 1927), which was more visually effective, though unfaithful to
the actual course of events. Iutkevich later uses this black-and-white
scene as an example of an actual newscast in his color film "Tales of
Lenin" (1957). There are disparities as well: Romm has Lenin protected by
the worker Vasilii rather than Eino Rakhia, his actual bodyguard, who had
already been "repressed" by the time of the film's making. Chiuareli has
Stalin himself take on this role of guardian angel. This maniacal
refinement of the fictional details of the October uprising affirms the
historical myth. Stalin's opponents, who were condemned during the
purges of 1936-38, were presented in these films as enemies of the
people even back then, in 1917. Lenin's presence in these films serves as
a backdrop for Stalin's actions. In Romm's "Lenin in October," Stalin helps
Lenin to a hideaway on the Finnish Gulf to escape Kamenev and Zinoviev
(the latter accompanied Lenin in reality). In "Lenin in 1918," also by

Romm, it is Stalin rather than Trotsky who wins the civil war and saves
Russia from famine, sending grain from the Volga to the central regions,
while Lenin recuperates from the assassination attempt organized by the
Socialist Revolutionaries and masterminded by Nikolai Bukharin! These
films were the first of many commemorative films, all of which reenacted
the revolution decade after decade with endless historical corrections.
History became cinema's independent creation — an eternally variable
present, and cinema truly became a collective art, reaching much further
than the frame of a single picture. All films became a collective
undertaking. "Film is an illusion, but it dictates its laws to life," Stalin said
in 1924.[47] This conviction greatly helped to affirm the illusion of "the
most important of all the arts," of the people's collective daydream about
their past and present. It is no accident that all individual artistic detail is
banished from the collective dream.
Another type of drama, the private drama, along the lines of Alexander
Rzhevsky's emotional screenplays, was proposed at the beginning of the
1930s. But if the monumental film minus the romantic subplot was
approved, then a film based on an emotional screenplay, however weak
the narrative, was rejected; most of the films based on Rzhevsky's
screenplays were banned or never finished ("The Ocean," "The Storm,"
"The Enthusiast's Way," Eisenstein's "Bezhin Field" of 1935-37). The
emotional screenplay interspersed the normal plot (generally a
melodrama) with various seemingly meaningless associations, frequently
nostalgic (as in Vsevolod Pudovkin's "A Simple Ooccurrence," 1932) or
wistful (as in Boris Barent's "By the Bluest Sea," 1935, which was based
on a screenplay written by a man who had been involved with the Oberiut
group, Konstantin Mints). This type of interjection, permissible in a quasihistorical chronicle, was considered unacceptable in any other genre and
characterized as "illiterate pulp ravings," "paeans to the elements of chaos
and crude naturalism."[48] With a bit of stretch one could view the
rejection of this model as the rejection of the audience's subjective
identification with the story on the screen, and especially with the
seemingly out-of-plot images (dreams, memories, moods); more
generally, it could be seen as objectivity forcing out subjectivity, to the
point of removing the subjective perspective and every means of directing
the individual's view codified in the '20s: the handheld camera, smooth
transitions, the emphasis on foreshortening. The camera must be firmly
affixed to its stand, the height of which is determined by the height of the
table. Horizon lines set too high or too low are avoided, and panned shots
are almost entirely absent. Real space is replaced more and more
frequently with the space of utopian reality; thus filmmakers abandon the
streets and move into the studio, where a backdrop replaces the horizon,

canvas replaces stone, buildings become false fronts, where space is
entirely subject to the whims of the screenwriter and the light man. For
two decades, from the 1930s to the mid-1950s, every set is constructed in
the studio—the Winter Palace and Paris during the Commune, waterfalls,
Arctic icebergs, deserts, taiga, the Volga . Eisenstein's "Ivan the Terrible"
(1946) might be interpreted in this context as a claustrophobic film about
closed, constructed space, which swallows up its characters. The
cameraman's skill is now judged not by his choice of foreshortening or his
handling of texture, but by his ability to lend depth to a flat canvas,
sharpness to a hand-painted backdrop, the combination of nature with
last-minute paint jobs in the studio, his ability to work with artificial light,
to splice together hand-drawn, constructed, and real objects, smoothing
out their differences with cinematic technique. Cameramen must master
all the techniques of illusion — working with dummies and mannequins,
rear-projection and transparent shots, maneuvers which the cinema of the
'20s had shunned as "magic tricks" and pointless mesmerizing
distractions. Lev Kosmatov, the cameraman on all of Mikhail Chiuareli's
films, became a master of this, as did Vladimir Nilsen, Grigorii
Alexandrov's cameraman, who in 1927 translated a book by Guido Seber,
a leading German cameraman-trickster, entitled The Technique of
Cinematic Tricks.
Cameramen had to avoid protocol photography as well as all outside
effects. Using light and watercolor to retouch a face was not considered
formalism, yet the frequent use of soft optics was perceived as
"unpleasant effete wateriness"; Iakov Protazanov was reprimanded for
this weakness during the filming of "The Bride with No Dowry"
(1936).[49] The choice of unjustified camera angles inspired even harsher
criticism than the choice of optics. The camera's path is usually motivated
by an individual's perspective, but since the subjective point of view was
forbidden, the "randomly" moving camera disappeared with it. In Lev
Kuleshov's "The Siberians" (1941), the camera shares the viewpoint of a
boy lying in the back of a cart, who is gradually losing consciousness. The
panorama of swirling treetops inspired reproachful comments about
unnatural camera shots and formalism. Oleg Leonidov, a film reviewer,
was of the opinion that presenting the world from the perspective of the
protagonist, particularly a protagonist who is about to pass out, was
unacceptable.[50]
The neutralization of cinematographic modes of expression was a preprogrammed phenomenon. Individual language is avoided, the artificial
folklorization of art becomes a palliative escape route — analyzed in
recent works by historians of Soviet film as the formalization of

mythological consciousness.[51 This is how the old quandary of Russian
film is modified: the modern is made archaic and the individual is
dissolved in the collective.
Modern Times. Siamese Twins
After the Party's first open reevaluation of its own history at the 50th
Party Congress in 1956, after the revelation of the atrocities committed
during the great terror and the debunking of Stalin, the history of Soviet
cinema seemed to begin anew once more, which was again manifested in
galloping numbers. During the course of five years the number of films
produced grew tenfold, from nine pictures in 1951 to 104 in 1956 and 150
in 1969. New film studios were built, and new technologies were
mastered: there were now more films made in color (in 1966 they made
up one third of the yearly production; in 1969 more than half, 82 out of
150 [52] as well as wide screen films (two in 1956; 67 in 1966) and 70
mm wide-format films (one in 1960; 9 in 1969). The number of movie
theatres tripled, and the politics of distribution changed radically once
again. 1949 was the first year in which the Soviet viewer could see foreign
movies, after a prolonged delay; at first they were trophy films brought
back from Germany , and afterward foreign films distributed for profit and
screened at the Moscow Film Festival (resumed after a twenty-four year
hiatus) — also called Foreign Film Week. The liberation of film from the
tight grip of the collective model, the open distribution, and the increase
in theatre seating led to a doubling of the number of filmgoers within the
space of ten years, with almost five million visiting the theatres in
1968.[53] The profit margin grew, and even at the beginning of the
1980s, when the number of filmgoers was reduced to the level of
1960,[54] and ticket prices never surpassed 70 kopecks, cinema still
brought in 16.4 million rubles in revenue.
Directors of different generations worked side by side in the film studios —
relics from the '20s and '30s, veterans of cold war cinema, alongside the
new prodigies (Grigorii Chukharii, Sergei Bondaruchnik) and twenty- and
thirty-year olds who had never experienced war, making their debut just
barely after receiving their degrees, such as Andrei Tarkovsky and Andrei
Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky. In its entire rich history of extreme variability,
Soviet cinema had never achieved such rapid changes in terms of
economics, structure, technology, and creativity.
Russian cinema now followed the international model of presenting
anonymous reality with no attempt at interpretation, not subject to the
ideological machinations of language. This was the aesthetic of Italian

neorealism, British “free cinema,” French cinéma verité and nouvelle
vague, and the new wave of filmmaking in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Its
features included long shots, natural sunlight instead of artificial studio
lighting, streets and original interiors instead of constructed film sets,
amateur rather than professional actors, black and white instead of
Technicolor, de-dramatization instead of intrigue, and a “dilletante”
aesthetic taking precedence over mastery and skill. Noise is valued above
dialogue. Characters wander mutely and aimlessly through the city
instead of engaging in scripted, dramatic conversation. The camera
observes life’s random flow, registers minute changes in the appearance
of people and city streets, in human communication, in all matters of
movement and nuance and speech; films such as Marlena Khutsieva’s “I
Am 20 Years Old” (1961-64) or “July Rain” (1967) become far more
captivating than the traditional scripted storylines. The new style is also
perceived as the unequivocal redemption of a “reality” freed from
ideological constraints, as described in books by André Bazin and Siegfried
Kracauer (whose translation into Russian was long overdue).[55] In this
context montage was viewed as a trick that undermined cinematic
integrity by manipulating the viewer’s attention and consequently his
opinion. Andrei Tarkovsky defined his technique as the aesthetics of
“capturing time” and accused Eisenstein of misunderstanding the laws of
cinematography.[56]
While Soviet film directors consider themselves indebted to neorealism,
the neorealists declared their model to be Mark Donskoi, famous for his
screen adaptations of Maksim Gorky’s autobiographical stories
“Childhood,” “In Public,” and “My Universities” (1936-39). The French
emulate the work of Dziga Vertov, and the very term cinéma
vérité originated as a translation of Vertov’s “kino-reality.” However, these
outward stylistic similarities with world cinema do not negate the deeply
rooted foundation of Soviet cinema — socialist utopianism.
The October Revolution and the second World War remained the central
historical events in collective memory, and the preservation of socialist
society was still outside the grasp of an individual person. This hierarchy
of values and unshakeable core of social organization severely limited
opportunities for innovation in dramatic structures. The parables at the
center of most contemporary films (exposing the enemy, reeducating the
individualist, emancipating women) remained essentially unchanged, but
with slightly different emphasis: the enemy was no longer a foreign spy,
but a conservative, a bureaucrat, or simply a cynic; the reeducation story
is somewhat ameliorated in the form of comedy; the emancipation story,
in contrast, moves from the comedic genre into drama. The working

woman is vulgar and smokes; her working husband does not understand
classical music and has only a tenuous grasp of grammar. These simple
shifts in the proletarian myth which Soviet cinema had propagated for
decades were now received as signs of renewal. “Truth” is declared to be
the crucial criterion for art, leaving only “superficial” visual similarities
with English or French film. Unshaven actors, worn and rumpled clothes,
poverty in the home, filth and muck in the streets -- these come to be
seen as evidence of “truth” and lend verisimilitude to stories of everyday
life. Filmmakers applied this style equally to contemporary plots, historical
pictures, and screen adaptations of literary classics. Grigorii Koznitsev
does “neorealistic” Shakespeare (“Hamlet,” 1964) and Mikhail Schweitzer
adapts Tolstoy in the neorealist style (“Resurrection,” 1960-61). Yet the
fact that all of these changes were minimal was nowhere more evident
than in that most traditional genre of Soviet cinema: the Revolutionary
film.
Of all the Stalinist films, only Chiuareli’s were banned outright. Stalin’s
image was deleted -- often by complicated technical maneuvers such as
rear-projection and the retouching of each individual frame -- from all of
the other ‘30s films. Mikhail Romm even re-shot several scenes for “Lenin
in 1918” twenty years after the original movie. Yet the historical concept
behind these films remained untouched, and after undergoing the process
of technical “de-Stalinization” they were re-released to condition and train
the collective memory. Sergei Iutkevich re-filmed old commemorative
stories of Lenin in the ‘50s, ‘60s, and even into the ‘80s. The historical
fiction of these films acquired a new documentary style. While Stalin’s
image disappears from the screen (much as his embalmed body
disappears from the mausoleum), the figure of Lenin is bestowed with a
variety of new, day-to-day details (we see him riding a bicycle, lost in
thought and wandering aimlessly down forest trails, sometimes sitting in
meaningful silence, indecisive at times, going to the movies -- just like a
character in any of the contemporary 1960s films) and finds a new form of
expression -- much like the protagonist of some modern French novel -- in
silent inner monologues (“Lenin in Poland,” 1965, “Lenin in Paris,” 1981).
The camera’s objective distance and various small signs of
individualization (the inner monologue, handheld camera, the expressive
use of foreshortening) make up the stylistic frame of 1960s cinema, which
sought -- for the first time in the history of Soviet film -- an individual
hero.
In the ecstatic mass scenes which became the hallmark of 1920s cinema,
the individual dissolved in a teeming sea of bodies; in the ‘30s, the
cinematic hero symbolically represented the working class on the screen,

nobly subject to the common fate. Without questioning the essentiality of
this subjugation, the films of the ‘60s frequently revealed its
inherent drama, exploring the destruction of personality. In “Ivan’s
Childhood” (1961) Andrei Tarkovsky’s protagonist is a child who has been
driven mad by war and has become its machine. The blame is shifted to a
blind and merciless historical cataclysm, which strips the individual of all
freedom and will. Italian Communists accused Tarkovsky of historical
fatalism and a lack of faith in progress after his film won the Golden Lion
award at the Venice film festival, and, not surprisingly, Jean-Paul Sartre
emerged as one of his staunchest supporters.[57]
The most significant change of the decade came with the gradual shift of
public interest toward the fate of the individual, one excluded from the
common biography. Even Ivan Pyriev, the director of
countless Kholkhoz pastorals in the 1930s, now filmed three consecutive
novels of Dostoyevsky’s—all of which had been taboo for two decades:
“The Idiot” (1958), “White Nights” (1960), and “The Brothers Karamazov”
(1968). Young French film critics immediately took note of this shift.
Regarding the screen adaptation of Chekhov’s “Jumping Girl” (by Samson
Samsonov, 1955), François Truffaut wrote: “An adulterer in a Soviet film!
Now we can finally breathe a sigh of relief!” For the first time he could
draw parallels between films from “over there” (from Russia), which had
previously struck him as nothing more than archaic “fairy tales,” and
something more familiar, such as Max Ophuls’s melodramas.[58] For the
first and last time in its history, a Russian film about an unfaithful wife
(Mikhail Kalatozov’s “The Cranes Are Flying,” 1957) won the Palme d’Or at
the 1958 Cannes Film Festival.
Soviet film critics often did not know what to make of these new
characters -- the unfaithful bride Veronica in “The Cranes Are Flying”; the
Red guerrilla fighter who falls in love with a White officer (“’41” by Grigorii
Chukhrai, 1956); or the hardened child for whom war is the only reality,
while life is a dream (“Ivan’s Childhood”). At long last, the soldier Andrei
Sokolov (in Sergei Bondarchuk’s “A Man’s Fate,” 1959) can be enshrouded
in his own, personaltragedy, apart from the overall euphoria of victory,
even despite triumph over the Reichstag!
A historical cataclysm, whether it be the War or the Revolution, was an
indispensable backdrop to the individual’s break with collective destiny
and righteousness. An emotional, biological experience (such as fear,
survival instinct, erotic passion) serves to justify and ensure the
emancipation of an individual’s personality, yet the cataclysm sets
the individual experience as an exception to the collective, thereby

mitigating the radical nature of the change. Moreover, in any mass action
(such as war) one will always find a collective chorus to stand apart and
comment upon the individual’s fate. In Grigorii Chukhrai’s “The Ballad of a
Soldier” (1959) this chorus serves to correct and guide the hero’s actions;
the lovers in “The Cranes are Flying” do not just wander along deserted
beaches, but also before the primary symbol of Soviet collective identity
— the mausoleum. As the Red guerrilla fighter falls into a forbidden love,
her dead comrades come to her in dreams. The camera's liberation, its
accentuated expressiveness, was inextricably linked to this new,
subjective, "intimate" take on historical experience. Cameramen such as
Sergei Urusevsky and Vadim Iusov now rivaled the top directors in fame.
Yet the strong independent personality in film was presented mostly as an
exception—one which carried subtle and inherent risks. Thus the
protagonist is frequently a criminal (as in Vasilii Shukshin's 1974 film "The
Red Rose," in which the eccentric personality belongs to a professional
thief), or else slightly psychotic (the same Shukshin's unconventional
cranks in his films "There Was Once a Fellow…" [1964] and "Just One
Word, Please" [1975]), or he is condemned to loneliness and solitude as
one of the "chosen" -- the great historical figure, the artist. Perhaps only
two directors—Andrei Tarkovsky and Sergei Paradzhanov -- rejected these
palliative options in favor of asserting individuality on the Russian screen,
and vehemently defended the author's autonomy in the artistic realm; this
was so untraditional within that singular construct called "Russian Cinema"
that it actually leaned more toward the Western European tradition, where
these two became better known than any of their Russian colleagues.
Paradzhanov creates a new image of the autonomous eccentric -- now he
is a homosexual, a blasphemer, an aesthete, a camp prisoner. Beginning
with "The Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors" (Ukranian, 1964) he
established himself as a director with a particular archaic style, which was
further developed as his own, Paradzhanov's, personal vision in "The Color
of Granite" (Armenian, 1969) and "The Legend of the Suramsky Fortress"
(Georgian, 1984). His camera remains markedly still; spatially, each
frame is flat, with frontal composition and no sense of linear perspective;
the actors' gestures are ritualized; the deliberately chosen color scheme is
restricted to red, blue, yellow, and black, all in stark definition.
Paradzhanov makes do without the use of montage; each shot, each
frame is constructed and presented as a painting, and demands careful
perusal, as if the viewer, contrary to all laws of cinematography, is not to
associate one frame with the next but must rather immerse himself in the
depths of a flat space, much as he would regard a painted canvas. Each
shot is overladen with meaningful details -- the symbolism of color,

costumes, the poetic text, which underlies all of his films; the enigmatic,
ritualized movement of the actors. Each of these seemingly symbolic
details cannot and in fact should not be deciphered, because their
meaning is freely invented by the director himself, and changes just as
freely from film to film. The aesthetic beauty of Paradzhanov's
compositions seems to dominate all other meaning, yet in his nonnarrative, stylistically naïve movies he manages to convey tragic and
philosophical ideas about death and sacrifice, exile and the loss of faith,
the loss of love, the loss of memory. Every one of Paradzhanov's films
ends on death's doorstep and is laced through with a tragic worldview, in
sharp contrast to the decorative, sensual, and highly unstable beauty of
his "textual" cinematic world.
Paradzhanov's unyielding conception of cinema as form and even as fable
in his 1964 directorial debut ("The Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors") first
makes evident his deliberate break with Soviet tradition. The Hutzul (a
Ukranian inhabitant of the Carpathian region-trans.) loses his beloved and
hence every remaining tie to life. Paradzhanov also approaches the
relation between the individual and the collective (a crucial theme in
1960s cinema) on a different level: as his individual characters break from
their family and heritage, the artist Paradzhanov perfects his distinctive
individual language. Students of Russian film generally interpret this
transition from an alien ritual and canon to a more personal form of
expression as the transition from mythical to Christian (hence individual)
thought patterns.[59] But it can also be understood as the development of
a personal artistic language, marked in Pradzhanov's work by his use of
color and the overall sense of space.
Andrei Tarkovsky's conception of an "author-created" film revolved around
the traditional narrative of individual choice, which torments the
characters of all of his pictures—from "Andrei Rublev" (1966-71) to
"Nostalgia" (1983) and "Oferet" (1985), which Tarkovsky made after his
emigration. Tarkovsky's assertion of his right to an individual viewpoint,
unhampered by any authority but his own, and to autonomy in his artistic
creation, generated his fundamental conflict not only with the authorities
governing "State-Cinema" but also with the entire Soviet cinematic
tradition, which left no room for aesthetic or ideological differences. (It is
telling that one of the leading directors of the 1930s, Sergei Gerasimov,
identified this as an ethical conflict: "This is an overestimation of one's
own persona, which is exclusionary: 'I am an individual phenomenon and
therefore I can make judgments unchecked even by the conscience and
reason of the people . . . . ' Such a position has nothing whatsoever to do

with our Communist morale."[60]
In his later book, Sculpturing in Time, Tarkovsky muses not so much
about cinema, art, and aesthetics as about the relations between the
individual and society, freedom and conscience, the physical and the
eternal. He sees the twentieth century as the end of the Great Inquisition
and the persecution of ideas; he believes that society can gradually
become more and more just, and offer new and more enlightened means
for the world's salvation. This idea of world salvation must include the
thoughts and actions of the loner, who has over time lost his ability to
think and feel. "World evolution is a collective effort" -- in each of his
films, Tarkovsky countered this maxim with the concept of individual
effort, which can affect history, civilization's progress or regression, and
even, in some mystical sense, the very fate of the world (as in "The
Sacrifice"). Though in that particular film the hero must sacrifice two of his
individual hypostases -- his home and his voice -- in order to save the
world from global catastrophe.
In Tarkovsky's view, art exists to give form to the fragile, easily lost
individual experience, memory, feeling, dreams. Thus his best-known,
most characteristic movie is probably "The Mirror" (1974) -- the first filmautobiography in the history of Soviet cinema, which even Tarkovsky's
faithful cameraman, Vadim Iusov, considered to be beneath the common
conception of art and fit only for amateur 8mm family film.
Although his subjectivity links him with author-driven Western filmmaking,
Tarkovsky also fits the stereotype of the enigmatic, metaphysical,
impenetrable Russian soul -- only this stereotype was no longer couched
in Eisenstein's exemplary montage sequences, which had fixed the idea of
the "divided Slavic soul" in Western imagination, but in the agonizingly
drawn-out plan-séquences, in which the viewer loses all sense of
direction, where actors whirl around the camera and the camera circles
among the actors, and contrasts are built not around the junctions
between shots but upon depth and proximity, different signposts,
contrasts between shadow and light, warm and cold light, a shot's slowed
tempo -- supported by a magnification of time and elliptical leaps among
various historical and cultural strata.
This same aggressive defense of subjective experience can be found in the
films of Kira Muratova, who provocatively aestheticized the "banal" as the
antithesis of the now meaningless "provincial melodrama" genre ("Long
Wires," 1972; "Discovering the White Light," 1984), or in the films of
Aleksei German, who found a "cinematographically individual" form of

expression in reconstructing "the greater meaning" of history, which had
been erased from intimate memory, forgotten "in general," and restored
only in loose, scattered details in the mind. All of the characters in his
landmark film "My Friend Ivan Lapshyn" (1984) recall the past
"incorrectly" in this sense because they generally lack the ability to
perceive reality and themselves within that reality. These characters
completely subjugate their individual differences to the commonly
accepted norm: the journalist trying to shoot himself cannot fathom that
Mayakkovsky had committed suicide; the actress, who is miserably in love
with the journalist and in turn scorns the unrequited love of the military
officer, is amused by the clumsy love affairs between Chekhov's
characters. The epileptic military officer, who is also a militia detective,
expounds on the health of society and future plans for building public
parks, all against the backdrop of a vacant lot and a ditch, from which
mutilated corpses are being unearthed behind him. To German this
represents the tragicomic inability to see the actual results of the medial
experiment -- Soviet cinema, which, more so than any other art in Soviet
history, had impressed a particular worldview upon every member of
society. For this reason he bases the aesthetics of his work on a rejection
of the "Soviet film" aesthetic created by the collective efforts of
filmmakers in the 1930s-50s: the clear shots, stationary camera, clear
sound quality to convey the crucial symbolic weight of the dialogue, were
all replaced with shaky camera-work and skewed asymmetrical
composition, in which random "unimportant" details are constantly
obscuring the protagonist, or simply the speaker, from view. The
complicated soundtrack, with its multiple overlays of noise, makes it
almost impossible to discern words through the din, bits of garbled
dialogue, and scraps of melody.
Yet these examples -- German, Muratova, Tarkovsky -- make plain that
the construct of Soviet cinema as such was a necessary element in their
'emancipation'; they are like Siamese twins and, once separated from one
another, once viewed outside their context, they lose their subversive
premise and their audience—that is, the viewer familiar with Soviet
cinema. In the 1970s, during the so-called "period of stagnation," the
social split between conformists and dissidents, the division of art into
official and outlawed categories, and the "Siamese twin" relationship
between Soviet and individual film became too obvious. Soviet cinema had
to make one final heroic effort to restore the disappearing reverence for
the collective. Thus films by Tarkovsky ("Andrei Rublev," screen
adaptations of "The Idiot" or screenplays written along the lines of
Hoffman), Muratova, and German were banned. The old familiar massaction films were resurrected on 70 mm film, in glorious full color and

stereophonic sound. Yuri Ozerov begins a military epic which spans twenty
years and eleven films, from "The Liberation" (1970-72) to "Stalingrad"
(1989), in which he once again offers up the battles of the second World
War as part of the collective biography, with Stalin and his field marshal
(either Zhukov or Rokossovsky) as the protagonists and thousands of
anonymous soldiers. These films might be viewed as a remake of Stalin's
"Ten Strikes" project, which had included films such as "The Battle of
Stalingrad," "The Third Strike," and "The Fall of Berlin." Sergei
Bondarchuk undertakes a similar remake, recreating the October
Revolution once again ("Red Bells," 1982), though this time with a
nominal attempt at historical accuracy. He introduces the quasi-realistic
character of the foreign correspondent and eyewitness John Reed into the
traditional, fictional cinematic space, but ultimately Reed is mute, an extra
instead of a chronicler of events. The "anonymous" film retained its role as
historical medium, and in these Bondarchuk repeats scenes from all of the
familiar old Soviet films—though on a new technical level, with better film,
optics, and recording equipment.
In this same decade of the '70s, when journalism, literature, theatre, and
film first became actively involved in discussing economic reform, civil
rights, education, and ecology, the model of '30s cinema emerged not as
a directive from above, but out of a specific and inherent artistic need.
These filmmakers did not see themselves as slaves to ideology, but rather
as the tutors of a nation, as messiahs, which lent their work an entirely
different weight and value. For such a mission, constructs such as
autonomous art, which Paradzhanov embraced so heartily, were entirely
too narrow.
The concept of Soviet film became fragmented and scattered enough to
include very disparate phenomena: state-ordered epics in the vein of
Ozerov's tank-operas; Bondarchuk's colossal endeavors; the subversive,
socially thought-provoking films of Gleb Panfilov; Tarkovsky's stubborn
individual authorship; and also a vast number of unremarkable, mediocre
Soviet melodramas which, however (unlike Tarkovsky, Bondarchuk, or
Panfilov), enjoyed enormous popularity—for example, Victor Rogovoy's
1971 film "The Officers" attracted 70 million viewers in the first year after
its release![61] But when even Russian viewers stopped attending the
cinema it became necessary to gamble on the native film-entertainment
industry and the "Hollywood-ization" of Soviet film, to the degree to which
ideological doctrine would permit, or course. Suddenly, the State-Cinema
itself was demanding staged historical films, imitations of Western models,
comedies, melodramas, socialist films about natural catastrophes -flouting all previously established guidelines. But Russia lost the arms race

on the cinematic-empire front, and Soviet cinema's time ran out almost
simultaneously with the fall of the Soviet Union.
During the short period of glasnost, between the end of the 1980s and the
beginning of the '90s, Russian cinema saw a boom in production once
again; it is impossible to recount exactly the number of films made per
year (whether it was 400, 500, or 600), but there was talk of the new
Hong Kong or the new Bombay, which would replace the socialist system
of film production. However, the boom ultimately proved not to be the
beginning of a new epoch, but a death-rattle. The entire hierarchy of
values was changing. Banned films were suddenly acknowledged as
masterpieces of the "period of stagnation"; marginalized directors took the
places of government laureates, previously occupied by the likes of
Bondarchuk. Once more history is rewritten in film, as part of the eternal
quest for the contemporary moment which Soviet cinema eternally
adjusted and revised. Instead of analytically debunking the old cinematic
myths, filmmakers of the perestroika era industriously went to work
imposing new ones, switching around the symbols of value. Stalin
becomes firmly entrenched on the Russian screen, though not as a god
but as a demon of history; crosses and ruined churches replace the red
stars and banners; instead of the commissars, the royal family is
romanticized and sanctified as victims of the Revolution. Anti-Stalin films
rapidly replaced the cultish paeans, but did not change the hierarchy of
genres in the old model of Soviet cinema. Although the authoritarian
structures suppressing individualism had supposedly been removed and
societal mainstays destroyed, the formerly Soviet cinema could not seem
to find its own autonomous identity. However, during the course of
the perestroika years it achieved a quality of aggressive realism
unprecedented in Russian film. "Little Vera" (1988), a slight and mediocre
film by the young director Vasilii Pichul, deliberately shocked Russian
audiences. Pichul discovered in Soviet society a mass person without
individual consciousness, and the critics were horrified that a Russian
should fall into the stream of Western twentieth century progression,
losing all touch with the cherished national tradition of spiritual
superiority. Besides this, the film presented naked reality with no
apologies or appeals to the ideological, metaphorical, pantheistic, or
metaphysical sensibilities. For this reason this mediocre film appeared so
novel and produced such a sensation. Yet the novelty was
essentially stylistic, and soon filth, ruined buildings, gutted factories,
industrial wastelands, and communal apartments were taken up by the
new wave of filmmakers as a photogenic natural environment. These ugly
yet aestheticized backdrops set the scene for a variety of narratives about
the decay of Soviet structures, especially its long-standing artistic taboos

against sex and violence. At the same time popular culture, which had
previously been suppressed much like the elite or the subversives, began
to assimilate sex, violence, and destruction into its own stories, without
the aestheticization.
Meanwhile viewers were no longer seeing Soviet films in the theatres; the
movie-theatres were glutted with the products of the American and
Western European entertainment industries, which led to an odd
reorientation. Directors made movies—pretty much as they had before—
with an imaginary viewer in mind, but the viewer's desires began to be
calculated by Western measures, and the new Russian cinema began to
adapt a foreign culture to post-Soviet film: the strong individual hero,
supremely sure of himself and confident in his own perceptions, has to
destroy the ideology of collective obedience totally and single-handedly
modernize Russian-Soviet society. Criminals, prostitutes, Hell's Angels on
motorcycles (usually portrayed as killers-for-hire in these plots) moved
into Russia's cinematic world. Russian filmmakers began to populate postSoviet reality with the aimless figures of Western cinema, lagging perhaps
by a decade or two: thus Moscow in the 1990s came to know American
hippies and Hell's Angels, mafiosi from the gangster thrillers of the early
'70s, or the Russian Rambo, relocated to spread mayhem and fight for
justice in the bloody Chechnyan conflict.
Yet it was not this amalgamation that truly washed away the traces of
Soviet cinema. It seems more likely that the final blow was dealt by
filmmakers such as Elem Klimov and Andrei Smirnov, who had enjoyed a
brief period of authority during perestroika. They managed to dismantle
the structures of state financing for films and the entrenched distribution
methods, and initiated the struggle against the "average, grey, mediocre
movie," which in turn resulted in the destruction of Soviet cinema. The
glut of "grey movies," "state-sponsored movies," and vulgar
entertainment had to be replaced with socially engaging or artistic
pictures. The program put forth by these filmmakers recalled Stalin's
"masterpiece" theory: why make so many middle-of-the-road movies,
when one could make a few works of genius? In this way the idea of
commercially based national film production was annulled -- and without
it, large-scale films were impossible to make.
Eventually the system of film financing collapsed completely in the
confusion of chaotic capitalism. The only survivors were rather marginal
affairs — alternative cinema (called "parallel" in Russia), or experimental
films which did not rely on mass distribution and were aimed solely at
specific audiences and the film festivals, such as Alexander Sokurov's

"Mother and Son" (1997). The marked attention that Russian cinema had
received on the international film scene during glasnost evaporated.
Distributors, Soviet audiences, and international film festivals were no
longer interested in Stalin, perestroika, or the absurdities of post-Soviet
life. (The film festivals had turned the spotlight on films coming out of
China, Africa, Iran, or Taiwan.) Now nostalgia set in. Post-Soviet viewers
began to enjoy the old Soviet films just as they had been viewed in the
'30s-'70s, with a childlike glee in repeated viewings—only now, of course,
on television. Out of the 6,500 speaking films made in the USSR during its
entire existence, exactly 115 were shown over ten times on television
during the past three years. Most of these were made during the 1930s;
perhaps the collective daydreams of social integration, staged in the
"grand style," continue to define the world of the Soviet and post-Soviet
man to this day.
The movie theatre, now transplanted to individual living rooms, remains a
place of collective gathering and unification, a safe retreat for a society
rocked to its core by the wave of reforms. Thus the peculiarities of
Russian cinema, which was created largely by Russia's unique assimilation
of modernity, have survived to this day, and the old "collective
daydreams" remained as surrogates for a nonexistent national creative
identity. The only difference is that the old mass-scale, solemn, noncommercial cinema is now consumed not as ideology, but as
entertainment; it has outlived the obsolete function to which Soviet
cinema had clung for so many years.
Perhaps it is this change in function that separates Russian cinema most
distinctly from that of the rest of the world. The turn-of-the-century
utopian imaginings, which presented the movie theatre as a place of social
unification and the dissolution of class differences, was replaced in the
'20s by a yet more radical vision; cinema became a laboratory for new
modes of thought, perception, and movement, with the capacity to reach
and transform millions. During Stalin's reign cinema was deliberately
made into a means of conserving and translating the loftier, more
traditional art forms, and a medium for the rewriting of history and
historical memory. The national infatuation with post-individual values,
established in the nineteenth century, remained crucial. This orientation
was reflected in the various stylistic peculiarities of the period—the archaic
treatment of poetics and the neutralization of expressive possibilities, both
hallmarks of the 1930s. Even the Russian cinematic avant-garde, who
created individually-authored film with its own singular poetics (and far
surpassing the experiments of the Futurists and Surrealists), aimed not so
much to express the individual "I" as to convey a total worldview,

revealing the motives behind historical processes and mass-scale events
which consumed the individual, with all of his personal thoughts and
experiences, and enslaved him to a causality beyond his control. Only
after the 20th Party Congress did Russian cinema attempt to delineate the
individual's drama within the collective destiny, which immediately
became evident in the new, subjective means of expression. Yet even this
process of liberation was firmly tied to Russian tradition. To this day, not a
single Russian film has successfully disentangled itself from the
mesmerizing paradigm of the "unhappy ending," which has been
disregarded only in the amalgamated cinema of pop culture.
Russian cinema, which, like any other cinematic school, had to define
itself within both the global and the local contexts, caught between
making its language universal and remaining trapped inside the strongbox
of national tradition or an author's individualism, offered up various
combinations during the course of this century. This text has pointed out
but a few of these.
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